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abstract: Biparental care of offspring is a widespread social be-
havior, and various ecological, life-history, and demographic factors
have been proposed to explain its evolution and maintenance. Raising
offspring generally requires several types of care (e.g., feeding, brood-
ing, and defense), and males and females often specialize in providing
different types of care. However, theoretical models of care often
assume that care is a single variable and hence that a unit of care
by the mother is interchangeable with a unit of care by the father.
We hypothesize that the ability of one parent to provide all types of
care may be limited by nonadditive costs or by sex-based asymmetries
in the costs of particular care types. Using an individual-based sim-
ulation, we show that synergistic costs of investing in two tasks or
negligible sex-based cost asymmetries select for task specialization
and biparental care. Biparental care persists despite intense sexual
selection and sex-biased mortality, suggesting that previous models
make overly restrictive predictions of the conditions under which
cooperation can be maintained. Our model provides a mechanistic
underpinning for published models that show that the synergistic
benefits of individuals cooperating can stabilize cooperation, both in
the context of parental care and in other social scenarios.
Keywords: evolutionary simulation, mortality, parental care, sexual
selection, social evolution.
Introduction
By providing care to its young, a parent can earn direct
fitness benefits in the form of increased survival and/or
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reproduction of their offspring. However, care is also costly
because caring parents can be taken by predators and/or
the energy cost of rearing young may precipitate into lower
postcare survival or future reproduction. Parents, there-
fore, face a trade-off between their own current and future
reproductive success (Hamilton 1964; Owens and Bennett
1994). Biparental care—which occurs in various insects,
fishes, frogs, birds, and mammals (Clutton-Brock 1991;
Tallamy 2001; Reynolds et al. 2002; Cockburn 2006; Royle
et al. 2012)—is a form of cooperation because the offspring
represent a joint public good: each parent’s costly invest-
ment provides benefits to itself and to its mate. This creates
conflict between parents: because they are usually not re-
lated to one another, each stands to gain by deserting the
current brood and shifting the full cost of care onto its
mate (Trivers 1972; Lessells 1999; Houston et al. 2005).
A rich theoretical literature has explored the ecological,
demographic, and behavioral factors that influence how
this dilemma is resolved and has identified when natural
and sexual selection should favor uniparental versus bi-
parental care. Fundamentally, biparental care will be main-
tained if one parent cannot successfully raise offspring
alone (Maynard Smith 1977; Houston et al. 2013) or if
biparental care can increase offspring fitness more than
the fitness gained by the deserting parent via remating or
increased survival (Grafen and Sibly 1978; Yamamura and
Tsuji 1993). Early models of the fitness payoffs of different
reproductive strategies have inspired more complex ex-
plorations of how the evolution of parental care systems
is influenced by variables such as adult sex ratio (Mc-
Namara et al. 2000; Kokko and Jennions 2008), sexual
selection (Kokko and Jennions 2008; Alonzo 2012), en-
ergetic reserves (Barta et al. 2002), and behavioral rules
parents follow in responding to one another’s care deci-
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sions (McNamara et al. 1999, 2003; Johnstone and Hinde
2006). Key predictions of these models have been exten-
sively tested in various species and ecological settings (Har-
rison et al. 2009; Trillmich 2010; reviewed by Alonzo 2010;
McGraw et al. 2010; Lessells 2012).
One aspect of parental care, however, has not received
detailed attention from evolutionary theorists—the prop-
osition that specialization by males and females into dif-
ferent care tasks may favor biparental care (Grafen and
Sibly 1978; Motro 1994; Kokko and Jennions 2008; Lessells
2012). Specialization may lead to synergistic (more than
additive) fitness benefits of biparental care accruing to
offspring—in extreme cases, making a lone parent unable
to raise any offspring—and may also constrain how each
parent can respond to changes in its mate’s care behavior
(see Harrison et al. 2009). Young animals typically require
various types of care: parents may incubate or brood their
offspring, feed and nurture them, and protect them from
predators and conspecifics. The extent to which males and
females perform (non)overlapping sets of these behaviors
shows conspicuous interspecific variation, and some spe-
cies show clear sex-specific task specialization. As an ex-
ample, in figure 1, we summarize the frequency of parental
task specialization in birds. Sex-based task specialization
is also commonly observed in biparental insect species,
with marked role division in bark beetles, dung beetles,
burying beetles, and ambrosia beetles (reviewed by
Trumbo 2012). Task specialization may occur on a gross
scale (e.g., in raptors, females typically incubate the eggs
and chicks, while males hunt for food for their mate and
their offspring) or may be very fine grained (e.g., in the
dung beetle Canthon cyanellus, both parents move the first
dung ball to the nest burrow, the male pushing and the
female pulling, the male excavates under the ball, and then
the female covers it with soil; Trumbo 2012). Despite the
fact that sex-based specialization in different components
of offspring care is known in many biparental species and
despite verbal discussions of how task specialization may
favor biparental care (e.g., Kokko and Jennions 2008; Less-
ells 2012), previous theoretical analyses of parental be-
havior have largely ignored that care is fundamentally a
multidimensional trait (Royle et al. 2012; Sze´kely et al.
2013) and simply modeled care as a univariate quantity,
assuming that one unit of care by the female is equal to
(and interchangeable with) one unit of care by the male.
A notable exception is the work of Grafen and Sibly
(1978), who showed mathematically that if sex-based care
specialization exists, it can promote the maintenance of
biparental care. However, this study does not explain how
care specialization evolves in the first place, which is im-
portant given that specialization is meaningless under uni-
parental care. An exploration of how task specialization
and biparental care might coevolve is still conspicuous by
its absence from the literature. Here we present the first
parental care model that investigates the origin of sex-
based care specialization and the concomitant stabilization
of biparental care. We explore two mechanisms by which
care specialization can arise: (i) greater-than-additive costs
of investing in two distinct parental care roles (e.g., feeding
versus defending the young) and (ii) a slight sex-based
asymmetry in the costs of these two tasks.
We use an evolutionary simulation where two types of
parental activity (care) are required to successfully raise
offspring and introduce either (i) a synergistic cost of con-
temporaneously investing in different types of care or (ii)
sex-based asymmetry in the costs of investing in care types.
These scenarios are easily envisaged: some types of care
cannot be performed simultaneously (e.g., incubating eggs,
foraging for food, and defending the nest from predators
are mutually exclusive), and in some cases one behavior
increases the cost of a second behavior (e.g., in birds,
leaving a clutch to forage imposes an additional cost of
rewarming the eggs on returning; Deeming 2002). Sexually
dimorphic traits may also lead to asymmetric costs of care
(e.g., in species with sexual size dimorphism, incubation
and brooding will be energetically cheaper for the larger
sex; Sze´kely et al. 2007).
By systematically manipulating the degree of cost syn-
ergism or sex-based asymmetry in costs, we investigate
whether any of these scenarios leads to the emergence of
sex-based specialization in a single type of care and, in
turn, more equal sharing of labor between males and fe-
males in a population otherwise characterized by unipa-
rental care. We also test whether role specialization makes
cooperation more robust to intense sexual selection and
sex-biased mortality, since the latter processes usually de-
stabilize parental cooperation (Kokko and Jennions 2008).
Our evolutionary simulation is based on a full population
model with density-dependent feedbacks where mating
rates are self-consistently derived, satisfying the Fisher con-
dition that each offspring has two genetic parents (Kokko
and Jennions 2008). An important consequence of the
Fisher condition is that the rarer sex has a mating advan-
tage compared with the more common one. Kokko and
Jennions (2008) have shown that the negative frequency
dependency generated by this condition has important ef-
fects on the evolution of parental care: any deviation from
biparental care in a population where the adult sex ratio
is 1 : 1 and the sexes are the same apart from the level of
initial investment in parental care would start a self-cor-
recting process, which results in a return to equal levels
of care. This happens because the sex that cares less be-
comes commoner in the mating pool, which, by the Fisher
condition, decreases its mating success, leading to in-
creased benefits of caring.
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Figure 1: A, Incidence of social role specialization in birds. The proportional contributions of males to four care behaviors (nest building,
incubation, chick brooding, and chick feeding) were quantified for 216 bird species (see the appendix, available online). For each species,
we calculated the variance in male contribution across the four behaviors (scaled between 0 and 1) as a proxy for parental role specialization.
Zero means no specialization (i.e., entirely overlapping male and female tasks), whereas values 10.5 reflect strong role specialization: females
take the main (or exclusive) responsibility for one care behavior and males for a second care behavior. B, Male (foreground) and female
African fish eagles (Haliaeetus vocifer; photo by T. Sze´kely). Raptors are among the most parental care role-specialized birds. The female
incubates and guards the chicks, while the male provides the majority of food for the chicks.
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Figure 2: Schematic of the “time in, time out” model.
Analysis
Model
To investigate how task specialization affects the evolution
of parental care, we developed an individual-based evo-
lutionary simulation using the “time in, time out” frame-
work (fig. 2). This framework is widely employed to study
sexual selection and parental care (e.g., Grafen and Sibly
1978; Clutton-Brock and Parker 1992; Kokko and Jennions
2008). In this approach, individuals can be either single
and hence available to mate (i.e., spending their time in
the mating pool) or engaged and hence unable to mate
because they are providing care (i.e., spending time out
of the mating pool; Kokko and Jennions 2008). Time is
discretized in our model, and the transition of individuals
from one state to the other happens once in a time unit.
Individuals switch from state in to state out as the result
of mating, where mating probability depends on the fre-
quency of both sexes, their encounter rate, and the strength
of sexual selection (see below). Parents, that is, individuals
in state out, provide care by allocating effort into two
distinct care tasks, for instance, feeding the young and
defending them from predators. Parents return to state in
from state out after finishing care. The allocation of effort
and the length of care are governed by the individual’s
genes. Individuals can die in any time unit, but their prob-
ability of mortality can depend on their sex and state. Our
model parameters and their baseline values are provided
in table 1; a detailed description of the model now follows.
In each time unit, single individuals of both sexes seek
partners with which to mate. This is modeled as choosing
one male and one female randomly from the pools of
singles for times. Here, Nm and Nfmin (N , N ) # rm f mating
are the number of single males and number of single fe-
males, respectively, while rmating (rmating ≤ 1) describes how
often individuals encounter one another. This formulation
allows for fulfillment of the Fisher condition; that is, each
individual has exactly one mother and one father (Kokko
and Jennions 2008). Consequently, members of the mi-
nority sex have an advantage in acquiring a mate compared
with those of the other sex (see above). We also consider
sexual selection: nonrandom variance in mating success
(Andersson 1994). Under sexual selection, some individ-
uals with specific attributes are consistently more suc-
cessful in acquiring a mate than others of the same sex
lacking the given attributes. As a consequence, individuals
that have mated have higher than average success in mat-
ing again. This increases the benefits of leaving the off-
spring; therefore, sexual selection can strongly favor de-
sertion by the sex in which variance in mating success is
nonrandom (Clutton-Brock 1991; Kokko and Jennions
2008; Alonzo 2010, 2012). To introduce sexual selection
into the model, we allow the mating probability of indi-
viduals that have mated previously to be higher than that
of those individuals that have never mated before (Kokko
and Jennions 2008). To achieve this effect, the probability
that the two chosen individuals form a mated pair and
produce offspring is given by mm # mf. If an individual
has mated before, then ms p 1 (s p m, f ). On the other
hand, ms p 1/ks, ks ≥ 1 (s p m, f ) if a male or a female
has never mated. Consequently, the mating probability of
a never-mated individual can be less than 1. In this way,
a mated individual’s status predicts its future mating suc-
cess; that is, we introduced a nonrandom variance in mat-
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Table 1: Parameters of the model and their baseline values
Description Symbol Value
Cost of performing task i alone, i p 1, 2 Ci 1
Synergistic cost of performing both tasks simultaneously C3 0
Benefit of receiving type i care alone, i p 1, 2 Bi 1
Synergistic benefit of receiving both types of care simultaneously B3 0
Skill difference D 0
Measure of variance in mating success for males and females, respectively km, kf 1, 1
Encounter rate for mate-searching individuals rmating .1
Length of care by males and females, respectively Lm, Lf 0–25, 0–25
Proportion of effort invested into task 1 Am, Af 0–1, 0–1
Parameter controlling the shape of survival curve a .2
Clutch size nyoung 1
Background mortality Mb .1
Strength of density dependence d 1.5
Carrying capacity K 5,000
Mortality of single males and females, respectively MS,m, MS,f .2, .2
Parameter affecting the mortality of caring males and females, respectively mC,m, mC,f .2, .2
Mutation rate .001
SD of deviance occurring during mutation .05
ing success (Kokko and Jennions 2008). We consider the
parameter ks to be a measure of strength of sexual selection
on sex s (Kokko and Jennions 2008).
An individual’s behavior is governed by its genes. Each
individual has two homologous chromosomes (i.e., they
are diploids). Each chromosome contains four alleles with
sex-limited expression (hence, each chromosome carries
four loci, two of which are not expressed in a given in-
dividual). In males, alleles Lm govern length of care (i.e.,
the time out; Kokko and Jennions 2008) and alleles Am
govern how much effort a caring male allocates to the two
care tasks. Likewise, a female’s behavior is determined by
Lf (length of care) and A f (allocation of care). The actual
values of Ls and As are the averages of the corresponding
allelic values, and allelic values fall between 0 and 1. The
value of Ls is rescaled by LC, the maximum possible length
of care (LC p 25 throughout), to express the length of
care in time units.
Mated individuals produce a clutch and provide care
for their offspring. During care, the A gene determines the
allocation of care between two different tasks: a proportion
of care As (s p m, f ) is invested in task 1, while (1  As)
is invested in task 2. The value of care, V, received by the
clutch in time unit t is
V p B (A  A )  B [(1  A )  (1  A )]t 1 m f 2 m f (1a)
[ ] B (A  A ) (1  A )  (1  A ){ }3 m f m f
while both parents care;
V p B A  B (1  A )  B A (1  A ) (1b)t 1 m 2 m 3 m m
while only the male cares; and
V p B A  B (1  A )B A (1  A ) (1c)t 1 f 2 f 3 f f
while only the female cares (fig. 3A).
Here B1 and B2 scale the effect of investment into tasks
1 and 2, respectively (B1 p B2 for all computations). Mean-
while, B3 describes the synergistic effect of the investment;
that is, if B3 1 0, then investing into both tasks simulta-
neously improves the value of care nonadditively. In other
words, if B3 1 0, then the investment in one task is not
interchangeable with the investment in the other. This may
be the case when it is essential to perform both tasks; for
instance, the young need both food and water or both
food and grooming. The value B3 p 0 can correspond to
the case when a parent can choose between two equally
suitable food sources. In this case, offspring survival is
independent of the allocation of effort between tasks 1 and
2. Note, if B3 1 0, then B1 and B2 are rescaled such that
the benefit of care at equilibrium remains comparable with
the case of B3 p 0 (fig. 3A).
Care by an individual is terminated either when the
individual decides to desert the clutch or when it dies.
In cases of desertion, the length of care, Ls (s p m, f ),
is governed by the individual’s L gene. This gene de-
termines after how many time units spent in care the
individual deserts the clutch. A deserting individual re-
turns to the pool of singles and can mate again in the
next time unit. We assume that neither parent cares
more per time unit as compensation for its mate’s de-
sertion or death. The total value of the care, VC, ac-
cumulates over the time units during which at least one
parent cares for the clutch. When both parents have
abandoned the clutch (for any reason), the young be-
This content downloaded from 193.6.168.152 on Thu, 14 Aug 2014 05:13:41 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
752 The American Naturalist
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
effort spent on Task 1 
va
lu
e 
of
 c
ar
e
B3
0.00
0.25
0.50
1.00
0 50
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
total value of care
of
fs
pr
in
g’
s s
ur
vi
va
l
C3
0.00
0.25
0.50
1.00
0.
08
0.
10
0.
12
0.
14
pa
re
nt
’s
 m
or
ta
lit
y 
ra
te
Δ
0.000
0.125
0.250
0.500
sex
male female
A B
C D
40302010
0.
08
0.
10
0.
12
0.
14
pa
re
nt
’s
 m
or
ta
lit
y 
ra
te
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
effort spent on Task 1 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
effort spent on Task 1 
Figure 3: Assumptions of the model. A, The value of care over the allocation of parental effort to task 1 in one time unit. Effort invested
in task 2 is 1  effort invested in task 1. B3 1 0 means that both types of care are required for offspring survival. The effect of B3 is rescaled
so that the maximum of the curve remains at the same value so the comparison of the runs is meaningful. B, The survival of offspring as
the function of total care received during the entire period of care. C, The effect of synergistic cost on parental mortality rate. When C3 1
0, there is an extra cost for investing in both tasks simultaneously. D, The implementation of skill difference (D). When D 1 0, the cost of
task 1 exceeds that of task 2 by D for females, and the inverse is true for males. Parameter values for C3 and D are chosen such that the
mortality costs are comparable when the two tasks are performed simultaneously.
come independent. Their number (nfledglings) depends on
the clutch size (nyoung), a parameter of the model, and
the total value of care accumulated so far, as follows
(fig. 3B; also see Kokko and Jennions 2008):
a2L /VC Cn p n e . (2)f ledglings young
Here LC is applied to rescale the value of care into the 0–
1 interval. The parameter a describes the shape of the
relation. Because nfledglings is usually not an integer, the ac-
tual number of fledglings a pair produces is n with prob-
ability P and n with probability 1  P, where n is the
smallest integer for which n 1 nfledglings, n is the largest
integer for which n ! nfledglings, while P p nfledglings  n.
The sex ratio at fledging is 1 : 1; that is, the probability
that a male is produced is 0.5, while females are produced
with probability 0.5. During production of offspring, the
parents’ genome crossed over with probability 0.5, and
mutation could change the value of any of the loci with
probability 0.001. If mutation acts, then the value of the
given locus changed by a random deviate drawn from a
normal probability distribution with zero mean and SD is
0.05. The fledged young become members of the single
pools and may mate in the next time unit.
Individuals may die at the end of the time units. Mor-
tality has two components. One is the probability of back-
ground mortality, Mb, which is independent of the current
behavior, while the other differs according to the state and
sex of the individuals. The probabilities of mortality per
unit time for single males and females are MS,m and MS,f,
respectively. The probability of mortality for an engaged
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female, ME,f, during a time unit depends on the allocation
of investment between tasks, as follows:
f f fM p m # [C A  C (1  A )  C A (1  A )] (3a)E,f C,f 1 f 2 f 3 f f
(mortality for an engaged male is similarly defined). Here
mC,s is a parameter of the model, while , , and
s s sC C C1 2 3
describe the effect of allocation (s p m, f ). If s sC p C1 2
and , then there is no synergistic effect, and anysC p 03
kind of allocation between the two tasks is equivalent in
terms of mortality cost (fig. 3C). If , then performingsC 1 03
tasks simultaneously incurs higher mortality and hence
should be avoided; that is, task specialization is expected
(fig. 3C). Individuals should also specialize in one type of
task if but ; that is, an individual is mores s sC p 0 C ( C3 1 2
skilled at performing one task versus the other (fig. 3D).
Consequently, the task that can be executed with less effort,
that is, for which (i p 1, 2) is smaller, should besCi
preferred. Let us measure the level of skill differences by
for females and for malesf f f m m mD p C  C D p C  C1 2 2 1
(fig. 3D). Hereafter, we consider complementary skill dif-
ferences as such that males and females mirror each
other—that is, —and we denote these skill dif-f mD p D
ferences with D. Note that at evolutionary equilibrium,
the expected cost of care does not differ between the cases
of , D p 0, and or D 1 0.s sC p 0 C 1 03 3
The actual mortality, M, also has a density-dependent
component as follows:
d1/(N/K)M p (M  M ) , (3b)b St,s
where subscript s is either m or f (i.e., male or female)
and subscript St is either S or E (single or engaged). Value
N is the actual population size, K is the carrying capacity
of the environment, and d scales the density-dependent
effect.
To test how sex-based role specialization affects parental
cooperation, we explore the effects of varying the syner-
gistic benefit B3, the synergistic costs , and the degree
sC3
of sex-based asymmetry in the cost of investing in tasks
1 and 2, D (fig. 3). To investigate the influence of sexual
selection acting on males, we manipulated the variance in
reproductive success of males relative to that of females.
We also manipulated the degree of sex-biased mortality of
caring parents. Each simulation started with 5,000 males
and females whose genes were initialized independently of
each other by a random number drawn from a uniform
distribution between the limits of 0 and 1. Each simulation
was run for 5 # 105 time units. At each time step, we
measured the average length of care and the proportion
of effort invested into task 1 for both sexes in the
population.
Data and R code for the simulation and the figures
presented here are deposited in the Dryad Digital Repos-
itory: http://dx.doi.org/10.5061/dryad.h4g74 (Barta et al.
2014).
Effects of Synergistic Benefits, Costs, and Skill Differences
In the baseline case, all parameters are symmetric for the
sexes (i.e., equal for males and females) and B3 p 1 (i.e.,
both types of care are needed for the offspring). Further-
more, we assume that and D are all 0. Under thissC3
scenario, both sexes provide care (biparental care; fig. 4A)
and both males and females invest into both types of care
(no task specialization; fig. 4B). In this case, biparental
care evolves because of the frequency-dependent effect
generated by the Fisher condition: for members of the
majority sex in the mating pool, it is more difficult to
obtain a mate than for members of the minority sex; there-
fore, for the majority sex, it is more beneficial to provide
care, everything else being equal (Kokko and Jennions
2008). This leads to an equalization of providing care.
However, when sexual selection acts on males (km 1 1, let
us call this the baseline case with sexual selection), uni-
parental care by females emerges (fig. 4C, 4D). The reason
why females provide more care than males is because sex-
ual selection favors successful males to focus on mate ac-
quisition, and hence they can increase their reproductive
success by providing little care.
Introducing skill differences (D p 0.5; fig. 3D) in the
case of baseline with sexual selection restores biparental
care (fig. 4E). As strong sexual selection is acting on males,
their intention is to desert the offspring soon after mating.
But desertion forces the females to provide both types of
care since offspring survival is the highest when they re-
ceive both types of care. Because of the skill differences,
this increases the mortality of caring females. The resulting
lower number of single females in turn makes it more
difficult for males to acquire a mate—a consequence of
the Fisher condition. Therefore, the benefit of early de-
sertion decreases, and males’ best option becomes to pro-
vide more care. This results in a more equal share of care
by parents that allows each sex to begin to specialize, that
is, to invest more into the task in which it is more efficient
(fig. 4F). The appearance of task specialization, however,
further increases the cost of desertion because a deserting
parent leaves its offspring without one type of care when
they need both of them. This makes biparental care more
beneficial, which in turn leads to a higher degree of task
specialization. This self-reinforcing process finally results
in a population where stable biparental care is maintained
by task specialization.
Introducing synergistic costs in the case of baseline with
sexual selection produces results consistent with entering
skill differences (results not shown). After desertion by the
male, the female provides both types of care, which elevates
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Figure 5: Skill differences (D 1 0; A, C) and synergistic cost (C3 1 0; B, D) rapidly produce task specialization (A, B), whereas for equal
division of labor (C, D) a synergistic benefit (B3 1 0) is also required. The level of task specialization is given as ,F(A  A )/(A  A )Fm f m f
where Am and Af are the effort invested in task 1 by males and females, respectively (note the effort invested in task 2 by sex s is ).1  As
Division of labor is measured as , where Lm and Lf are the length of care provided by males and females, respectively.1  F(L  L )/(L  L )Fm f m f
Am, Af, Lm, and Lf are genetically determined. Medians (symbols) and interquartile ranges (error bars) of 22 independent runs are given.
For values of other parameters, see table 1.
her mortality because of the synergistic costs. This, through
the Fisher condition, decreases the benefit of desertion,
and so males remain to provide care; in this way, biparental
care evolves. For reasons similar to those above, task spe-
cialization emerges. Because of the synergistic costs, both
parents should avoid investing in both tasks equally, and
hence they invest in one task. In addition, because of the
synergistic benefits, the parents, given that both of them
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Figure 6: Effects of synergistic costs (C3 1 0; A, C, E) and skill difference (D 1 0; B, D, F) on cooperation between parents are robust to
changes in mating rate (A, B), sex-specific mortality of single individuals (C, D), and background mortality (E, F) when intense sexual
selection acts on males (case of baseline with sexual selection; other parameters are as in table 1). Medians (symbols) and interquartile
ranges (error bars) of 22 independent runs are given.
provide care, prefer to invest their efforts into different
tasks; that is, if the male invests, let us assume, in task 1,
then the female invests in task 2 or vice versa. As a result,
a population with stable task specialization and stable bi-
parental care evolves.
Systematic manipulation of B3 with D or shows that
sC3
task specialization evolves even under small values of sC3
( ≥ 0.25) or D (D ≥ 0.125), even when benefits aresC3
purely additive (B3 p 0; fig. 5A, 5C). However, for the
evolution of biparental care, an additional condition is
required: B3 should be relatively large (B3 1 0.25); that is,
tasks 1 and 2 should be functionally different for the off-
spring (fig. 5B, 5D). The latter result shows that two types
of tasks facilitate biparental care only if both tasks are
necessary for the success of the offspring (synergistic ben-
efits) and either skill differences or synergistic costs make
the simultaneous performance of the two tasks extra costly.
Additional computations show that these results are robust
to changes in mating rate, sex-specific mortality of single
individuals, and background mortality (fig. 6).
Effects of Sexual Selection and Mortality Cost of Care
With increasing intensity of sexual selection on males, the
proportion of male care decreases; that is, uniparental care
by females evolves. However, the effects of synergistic ben-
efits (i.e., offspring need both types of care) with the par-
ents specializing in different tasks (either because of skill
differences or synergistic costs) counteract even the effect
of strong sexual selection, and biparental care remains for
a large range of sexual selection (fig. 7A, 7B).
The mortality cost of parental care also influences the
pattern of care. When the cost of care is equal for the
sexes, both parents provide care. If the cost of mortality
differs between the sexes, then the sex with lower mortality
cares for the brood and the other parent deserts. Never-
theless, synergistic benefits and parental specialization may
counteract the effect of mortality-cost differences, and care
remains biparental for rather large mortality differences
(fig. 7C, 7D).
Discussion
We used an evolutionary simulation to show that when
offspring require two noninterchangeable types of care,
the synergistic costs of performing both tasks, or sex-based
asymmetry in the costs of performing the tasks, leads to
the emergence of task specialization and biparental care.
It may be possible to test this prediction by exploring
whether more equal division of care coevolves with task
specialization across species that exhibit variation in both
care division and task specialization; birds and insects are
two groups that could lend themselves to this type of
analysis. Our model also showed that task specialization
makes biparental care more robust in the face of strong
sexual selection or sex-biased mortality.
Our results highlight a potential limitation of previous
theoretical work that considers care to be a univariate
quantity: failing to take into account the multivariate na-
ture of care may lead to overly restrictive predictions of
the ecological or demographic conditions under which bi-
parental care can be maintained. For instance, in their
seminal paper, Kokko and Jennions (2008) establish that
biparental care exists when males and females have the
same demographic and life-history values, and uniparental
care emerges if at least one parameter is different between
male and female parents. Our model shows that this is
not necessarily the case: if the sexes specialize into different
tasks, then biparental care emerges even if the sexes differ
considerably in demographic or ecological traits. Further-
more, in their influential paper, Gross and Sargent (1985),
on the basis of a unidimensional parental care model,
suggest that the evolution of parental care may have cy-
clical dynamics; that is, populations with biparental care
can be invaded by deserters leading to uniparental care or
no care. From these states, biparental care can then emerge
again. Our results, however, suggest that if care is multi-
dimensional, then the occurrence of cyclical dynamics is
less likely.
It is difficult to determine whether the values we use
for and D are realistic, because remarkably few exper-sC3
imental studies have sought to determine whether the costs
of different care activities differ for males and females or
whether the costs of care behaviors combine nonadditively
(Lorme´e et al. 2005). However, several observations sug-
gest that the scenarios envisaged in our model are realistic.
First, in birds, the cost of rewarming eggs is consistent
with the costs of incubation and care behaviors that nec-
essarily entail leaving the nest (e.g., defense and foraging)
combining synergistically. Second, some traits that directly
influence the efficiency with which an animal can under-
take a care behavior are under sexually antagonistic se-
lection; for instance, in species with large sexual size di-
morphism, the costs of incubation, hunting, and defense
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Figure 7: Increasing strength of sexual selection on males rapidly leads to desertion (no care) by males if B3, D (A), or (B) is zero. If
sC3
there is a synergistic benefit (B3 1 0) and skill differences (D 1 0; A) or a synergistic cost ( 1 0; B), then biparental care is maintained
sC3
even under strong sexual selection. The sex experiencing a higher level of mortality during parental care deserts while the other sex provides
care if B3 is zero and D (C) or C3 (D) is zero. If there is a synergistic benefit (B3 1 0) and either skill differences (D 1 0; C) or a synergistic
cost (C3 1 0; D), then biparental care is maintained even for large differences in sex-specific mortality. Vertical dashed lines mark the baseline
cases (i.e., when there is no sexual selection or the mortality is equal for the two sexes), while horizontal dashed lines mark the equal
division of labor. Medians (symbols) and interquartile ranges (error bars) of 22 independent runs are given.
are likely to be sex specific, as has been suggested for the
co-occurrence of large sexual size dimorphism and care
role specialization in raptors (Andersson and Norberg
1981). Third, in some biparental species, one sex displays
specialized morphology or physiology related to care; for
example, in some altricial bird species, only one sex de-
velops a brood patch. Finally, in burying beetles, males are
both more likely than females to guard the nest and more
effective than females at performing this task (Trumbo
2006). Future empirical work is needed to test (1) whether
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the costs of performing specific care behaviors (as mea-
sured by loss of mass or condition) differ between males
and females and (2) whether experimentally increasing
investment in one type of care may lead to a greater than
linear decrease in investment in a second care behavior.
Morphological and physiological specialization for care;
that is, skill differences, however, may not necessarily result
in biparental care. In placental mammals, for instance,
only females develop elaborated machinery for gestation
and lactation of the young, yet the predominant pattern
in mammals is female-only care. A recent model (J. M.
McNamara and M. Wolf, unpublished data) suggests that
this can be the consequence of skill differences themselves
evolving, a proposition that is not addressed in our model.
It would be interesting to see what happens if differential
costs can evolve under condition of multidimensional care.
Patterns of care in humans, where males and females sup-
ply generally different resources to the offspring although
fathers can contribute the majority of calories consumed
by infants (Geary 2000), suggest that multidimensional
care and specialization may maintain biparental care even
in the face of evolving skill differences.
While we have specifically addressed the evolution of
cooperation between parents, our results are consistent
with the recently emerging view that within-population
variation promotes cooperation in various contexts. Re-
searchers have observed that behavioral diversity and con-
comitant division of labor increases the productivity of
group-living spiders and ants (Modlmeier et al. 2012;
Pruitt et al. 2012). Furthermore, behavioral variation and
partner choice can enhance cooperation in standard game
theoretic and market-based models (Noe¨ and Hammer-
stein 1994; McNamara et al. 2004, 2008; Johnstone and
Bshary 2008; Gavrilets 2012).
In our model, variation between individuals arose in
two ways, both of which resulted in cooperation. First, it
was a priori wired in by imposing skill differences between
the sexes. Second, more importantly, role specialization,
and hence variation, also spontaneously emerged when the
sexes were alike, but simultaneous task performance was
penalized. In biological market models (Noe¨ and Ham-
merstein 1994; Johnstone and Bshary 2008), role special-
ization is assumed a priori, and modeling concentrates
purely on how the relative frequencies of two specialized
parties influence the maintenance of cooperation (the law
of supply and demand; Noe¨ and Hammerstein 1994). In
contrast, in our model, task specialization evolves de novo
and is then subject to market forces (e.g., feedback between
single and caring individuals and density-dependent pop-
ulation regulation). Therefore, an important proposition
emerging from our model is that the evolution of coop-
eration and role specialization are coevolutionary pro-
cesses that reinforce each other. This means that not only
does variation promote cooperation, but the evolution of
cooperation can generate variation. This parallels the work
of Nonacs and Kapheim (2007), who point out that such
a process, which they term “social heterosis,” can facilitate
the evolution of cooperation in the absence of close genetic
relatedness and hence uniformity. Specialization and social
heterosis thus provide an alternative route to cooperation
that is distinct from kin selection (Hamilton 1964).
Many organisms rely on multiple types of cooperative
behavior to exploit their environment, and animal societies
commonly feature some degree of division of labor such
that individuals specialize in different social roles (Oster
and Wilson 1979; Ratnieks and Anderson 1999; Sugiyama
and Sugiyama 2003; Arnold et al. 2005; Gazda et al. 2005).
However, despite suggestions that social role variation may
stabilize cooperation by increasing the interdependence of
individuals or by increasing group productivity via efficient
division of labor, it is interesting that the vast theoretical
and empirical literature on the evolution of intraspecific
cooperation (Sze´kely et al. 2010; Bourke 2011) includes
little explicit consideration of how the costs and benefits
of investing in distinct cooperative behaviors interact and
the implications this has for the coevolution of multiple
social traits (also recently argued by McNamara 2013; see
also Queller 1985). There is, however, one context in which
cost trade-offs between different tasks have explicitly been
invoked in social evolution. In his work on the evolution
of multicellularity, Michod (2006) argues that convex cur-
vature of the trade-off function between reproduction and
viability (i.e., a synergistic cost of investing in both) is a
prerequisite for germ-soma specialization and hence co-
operation between cells. We note the parallel between this
work and our model of cooperation over care. However,
in contrast to the multilevel selection approach taken by
Michod (2006) and a recent game-theoretic analysis of
social role specialization (Boza and Sza´mado´ 2010), we
show that social role specialization can promote the evo-
lution of cooperation without the need to invoke group-
level competition. We therefore propose the general hy-
potheses that synergistic costs and skill differences between
two or more cooperative traits should confer a selective
advantage to specialization, which in turn stabilizes co-
operation over evolutionary time. A crucial step in testing
whether our hypothesis can be extended to situations other
than a care dilemma between two parents would be to see
how relaxing the Fisher condition (i.e., having exactly two
partners play the game) would alter our results.
In conclusion, we have considered two ways in which
investment in discrete care behaviors can be linked: syn-
ergistic costs and sex-based cost asymmetry. We demon-
strate that, when offspring require both types of care, syn-
ergistic costs or sex-based asymmetry lead to the evolution
of sex-based care role specialization and the concomitant
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stabilization of biparental care, even under strong sexual
selection or sex-biased mortality. Aside from work on the
evolution of multicellularity (Michod 2006), we are not
aware of any other published work that explores the con-
sequences of synergistic or asymmetric costs for the evo-
lution of cooperation. While several authors (e.g., Nonacs
and Kapheim 2007; Lessells 2012) have made verbal ar-
guments that specialization should stabilize biparental care
(or cooperation in general), numerical explorations of how
and to what extent this can occur appear to be lacking
from the literature. Thus, our model contributes to social
evolution theory by (a) providing a specific process—task
specialization—by which cooperation may arise, (b) show-
ing that synergistic costs are as important as synergistic
benefits, and (c) showing that task specialization and co-
operation can coevolve. Therefore, the multidimension-
ality of many behavioral traits and resultant role special-
ization may be significant and currently not fully
appreciated facilitators of social evolution.
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